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I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE. 
A. Nature of the Case. 
This appeal arises out of a dispute between Appellant Liberty Bankers Life Insurance 
Company ("Liberty") and Respondent Witherspoon Kelley Davenport & Toole, P.S. 
("Witherspoon") as to the priority of their competing security interests in certain real property 
(Blocks A, D, and E), formerly owned by The Point at Post Falls, LLC "(The Point"). This appeal 
also involves the competing claims of Liberty and Witherspoon in certain property known as the Post 
Falls Landing Marina (referred to herein as "the Marina improvements"), and whether said property 
is a fixture or personal property. 
Witherspoon previously acted as legal representative for The Point. In order to secure its 
growing obligation for unpaid fees and costs, The Point granted Witherspoon a Deed of Trust on 
nine (9) contiguous parcels that The Point intended to develop as the Post Falls Landing project. 
Liberty later agreed to provide project financing to The Point. The Point granted Liberty a Deed of 
Trust on the same nine (9) parcels. As a condition of Liberty's loan, Witherspoon agreed to specific 
terms by which it would subordinate its lien to Liberty's lien. Witherspoon retained a perfected first 
lien position in the personal property of The Point. 
Between 2005 and 2010, Liberty modified its loan to The Point on numerous occasions, each 
reflected by a separate Loan Modification Agreement (LMA). Witherspoon executed several 
specific subordination agreements as conditions of Liberty's modifications to its loan to The Point. 
As the years passed, The Point's secured indebtedness to Witherspoon continued to mount. 
In agreeing to subordinate its Deed of Trust to the modification under the Seventh LMA betv,·ccn 
Liberty and The Point, Witherspoon specifically limited the scope ofits subordination to exclude any 
further modifications to The Point's loan to Liberty. 
Liberty's loan under the Seventh LMA placed it out of compliance with the conditions of a 
Consent Order entered in the State of Florida. In order to achieve compliance, Liberty was required 
to restructure its loan under the Eighth LMA, which provided for a release of Liberty's original lien 
as to Blocks A, D, and E ( to which Witherspoon had subordinated), and the creation of a new Deed 
of Trust lien (to which Witherspoon had not subordinated). Despite making representations under 
penalty of perjury that the Eighth LMA governed, Liberty intentionally proceeded with a non-judicial 
trustee's sale under the Seventh LMA. 
Witherspoon claims that Liberty is bound by the terms of the Eighth LMA and that the 
resulting trustee's sale, which failed to comply with Idaho statutory requirements, was void as to 
Witherspoon. As a result, Witherspoon claims a first priority lien in Blocks A, D, and E. 
Witherspoon also claims a first priority lien in the Marina improvements on the basis that the same 
constitute personal property. The parties tried their respective claims to the District Court. The 
Court found that Witherspoon had a first priority lien in Blocks A, D, and E (under Witherspoon's 
Deed of Trust), and that the Marina improvements constituted persona! property in which 
Witherspoon had a first priority lien. The District Court's decision was proper, as a matter of fact 
and law, and should be affirmed. 
B. Course of Proceedings. 
On November 14,2012, Liberty non-judicially foreclosed upon nine (9) contiguous parcels 
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of property owned by The Point. R., Vol. 1, p. 4 (,r 16) and pp. 50-106. 1 Included in the nine (9) 
parcels which Liberty foreclosed upon were three (3) parcels described herein as "Blocks A, D, and 
E." Liberty's foreclosure proceeded under an August 26, 2005 Deed of Trust granted by The Point, 
as modified by a Seventh Loan Modification Agreement (LMA) recorded September 3, 2010. R., 
Vol. I, pp. 16-49 and 64; Ex. EE. 
Witherspoon notified Liberty of its claim that the Marina improvements constituted personal 
property encumbered by a perfected first priority lien in favor of Witherspoon. Ex. AAA. Liberty 
disagreed, asserting that the Marina improvements constituted fixtures of the realty which it had 
foreclosed upon. Ex. CCC. Liberty filed suit seeking a judicial declaration that Liberty held title to 
the Marina improvements under its Trustee's Deed, and that any interest of Witherspoon in the same 
had been foreclosed out. In support of its claim, Liberty alleged that its non-judicial foreclosure 
under the Seventh LMA had been conducted "in substantial compliance with Chapter 15, Title 45, 
Idaho Code." Id. 
Witherspoon answered, denying that the Marina improvements constituted real property and 
further denying that Liberty's foreclosure had been conducted in compliance with I.C. § 45-1501, 
et seq. R., Vol. 1 at pp.116-18 (,r,r 13, 27, and 30). Witherspoon also alleged that Liberty's claims 
were contrary to the specific terms of certain "Subordination Agreements" previously entered into 
between Liberty and Witherspoon. Id. at p. 118 (,r 28). 
Pursuant to a Stipulated Order, Witherspoon later filed its "First Amended Answer and 
1The Clerk's Record is cited as "R., Vol. I" for Volume I, "R., Vol. 2" for Volume 2, and 
so forth. The Reporter's Transcript is composed of two unlabeled volumes. The larger transcript 
(consisting of 287 pages) includes the transcript from the two-day bench trial and is cited as "Tr., 
Vol. 1." The deposition transcript of Harry Green, which was admitted at trial as Court Ex, l; is 
cited as "Green Depo." Trial exhibits are cited as "Ex." 
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Counterclaims." R., Vol. 2, pp. 267-69; 270-90. Witherspoon alleged, inter alia, that Liberty and 
The Point had executed an Eighth Loan Modification Agreement (LMA); that Liberty's conduct 
estopped it from denying the effect of the Eighth LMA; that Witherspoon had never subordinated 
its Deed of Trust to the Eighth LMA; and that Witherspoon therefore had a first priority lien in 
Blocks A, D, and E. Id. at pp. 283-84 (1130-35). Witherspoon also asserted counterclaims for 
breach of contract, conversion, and slander of title. Id. at pp. 285-87. 
On September 10, 2013, Witherspoon moved for partial summary judgment, seeking 
declaratory relief that Liberty was estopped from denying the enforceability of the Eighth LMA and 
that Witherspoon had never agreed to subordinate any of its security interests or rights to the same. 
R., Vol. 3, p. 525. On October 15, 2013, following briefing and argument on the motion, the District 
Court entered its "Memorandum Decision and Order." R., Vol. 5, pp. 1048-54. The Court found 
in part as follows: 
1. Liberty failed to assert any specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue 
as to whether Liberty is estopped from denying the enforceability of the 
Eighth Loan Modification Agreement. Additionally, Liberty may not seek to 
assume a position in this case which is contrary to the position taken by Mr. 
Phillips [Bradford A. Phillips, Liberty's President] in Liberty v. Green, 
(Kootenai County Case No. CV-11-10121 ), therefore, under the doctrine of 
judicial estoppel, Witherspoon is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 
Witherspoon's Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED and Liberty is 
estopped from denying the enforceability of the Eighth Loan Modification 
Agreement. 
2. The Court finds that there are genuine issues of material fact regarding 
whether Witherspoon agreed to subordinate its second position Deed of Trust 
to the Eighth Loan Modification Agreement, therefore Witherspoon's Motion 
for Summary Judgment is DENIED as to that issue. 
R., Vol. 5, p. 1052. 
Prior to trial, the parties submitted "Stipulated and Admitted Facts." R., Vol. 5, pp. 1077-82; 
4 
R., Vol. 6, pp. 1156-57. The matter was then tried to the District Court on December 16 and 17, 
2013. On January 8, 2014, the Court entered its "Findings ofFactand Conclusions of Law," finding 
(1) Liberty held title to Lots A, D, and E subject to Witherspoon's first priority 
Deed of Trust. 
(2) Because the Marina and its improvements "were not intended to be 
permanent fixtures of the Post Falls Landing project, the third and most 
important element of [the] Ravl [Rayl v. Shull Enterprises, Inc., 108 Idaho 
524, 700 P.2d 567 (1984)] fixtures analysis is not satisfied. Therefore, and the 
Court finds that the Post Falls Landing Marina and the improvements thereto 
constitute personal property in which WKDT has a perfected, first priority 
security interest." 
R., Vol. 6, pp. 1201-02. The District Court found in favor of Liberty on Witherspoon's counterclaims 
for trespass and slander of title. Id. The Court did not reach Witherspoon's breach of contract claim 
(asserted as a third-party beneficiary of the Eighth LMA), concluding instead that the contract claim 
had been rendered moot by the Court's determination that Witherspoon held a first priority position 
on Blocks A, D, and Eon alternative grounds. Id. Liberty thereafter moved for reconsideration. R., 
Vol. 6, p. 1204. 
On February 22, 2014, the District Court entered its "Order Denying Plaintiff's Motion to 
Reconsider." Id. at pp. 1271-74. In denying Liberty's motion, the District Court held that "based 
upon Mr. Phillips' inconsistent positions taken throughout the proceedings and based upon Liberty's 
stake in the outcome of this case, the Court finds that Mr. Phillips' testimony lacked credibility." 
Id. The Court entered its "Final Judgment and Decree Quieting Title" on March 12, 2014. Id. at pp. 
1315-39. Liberty timely filed its appeal on March 21, 2014. Id. at pp. 1340-46.2 
2During the pend ency of this appeal, Liberty unsuccessfully moved the District Court to stay 
the non-judicial foreclosure noticed post-judgment by Witherspoon under its first priority Deed of 
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C. Statement of Facts. 
1. The Landing at Post Falls Property. 
In September of 2001, The Point purchased approximately thirty-four (34) acres of real 
property in Post Falls, Idaho from Louisiana-Pacific. R., Vol. 6, p. 1185. The property, which 
formerly served as a sawmill, is bordered by Spokane Street to the east and the Spokane River to the 
south. Id. At all times material, Harry Green was the principal for The Point. Green envisioned a 
mixed-use residential and commercial project on the property, including a marina. Exs. 1, 3. 
2. The Point's Relationship With Witherspoon, Kelley, 
Davenport & Toole, P.S. 
Witherspoon was the legal representative for a number of business entities associated with 
Green, including The Point. R., Vol. 6, p. 1185. In September of 2004, in order to secure payment 
of fees earned and costs incurred, Witherspoon received a Promissory Note from Green and The 
Point. Ex. A. The Note was secured by a first Deed of Trust (referred to herein as "Witherspoon's 
Deed of Trust") on The Point's Post Falls property. Ex. B. 
In December of 2006, Green and The Point executed a "First Replacement Promissory Note," 
which acknowledged the growing principal balance then owed Witherspoon and which extended the 
maturity date. The Note was again modified in 2009 to acknowledge the still growing principal 
balance of nearly $700,000 in principal and interest. Ex. N. The amendment also extended the 
maturity date for the obligation secured by Witherspoon's Deed of Trust. Id. 
In August of 2010, Green and The Point modified Witherspoon's Note and Deed of Trust for 
a third time. Ex. R. The modifications acknowledged that the obligation to Witherspoon had grown 
Trust on Blocks A, D, and E. Liberty then moved this Court for entry of an order staying the non-
judicial foreclosure noticed by Witherspoon. This Court denied the motion. 
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to $920,000 in principal and interest. The Note's maturity date was again extended. Id. In addition, 
the security for Witherspoon's Note was expanded to include the following: 
(1) All fixtures, machinery, equipment, inventory and personal property of 
whatever nature used in connection with the Marina and convenience store 
facility now and hereafter constructed upon, attached or adjacent to The 
Point's property. 
(2) All of the Marina and convenience store facilities constructed on or adjacent 
to and attached to The Point's property, including the convenience store and 
other buildings located upon the Marina facility, including piers, docks, 
ramps, walkways, lighting and all other personal property constituting the 
Marina facility. 
(3) The rents, income, profits, insurance proceeds, accounts receivable and all 
other intangible personal property related in any way to the Marina and 
convenience store facility and its business operations. 
Ex. R. Witherspoon thereafter perfected its security interest in the enumerated items of personal 
property by filing a UCC-1 Financing Statement with the Idaho Secretary of State on September 7, 
2010. Ex. S.3 
3. Liberty Provides Project Financing to The Point. 
On August 26, 2005, Liberty loaned The Point $3.9 million. Ex. T. Liberty's loan was 
secured by a Deed of Trust on The Point's property. Ex. V. As a condition of the loan, Liberty 
required that Witherspoon subordinate its Deed of Trust to Liberty's Deed of Trust. Ex. H. Pursuant 
to Subordination Agreement Witherspoon executed for the benefit of Liberty, Witherspoon agreed 
to subordinate its Deed of Trust to the Liberty Deed of Trust "and any renewals or extensions 
thereof .... " Id. 
3To the extent that the Marina improvements constitute personal property, there is no dispute 
that Witherspoon has a first-priority perfected security interest in the same. Liberty makes no claim 
to any perfected security interest in The Point's personal property, whether superior or subordinate 
to the security interest of Witherspoon. 
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Liberty's initial loan was extended to The Point with no marina in place. Tr., Vol. 1, p. 103. 
Liberty did not condition the loan upon The Point's construction of a marina. Id. at p. 104. Liberty's 
initial loan did not obligate Liberty to provide any subsequent financing for a marina. Id. at p. I 07. 
In February of 2007, Liberty and The Point entered into the first of many Loan Modification 
Agreements (LMAs). Ex. X. Pursuant to the initial LMA, Liberty increased The Point's loan to $5.5 
million. Id. The loan provided The Point with additional financing for the development of twenty 
(20) condominium units. Id. Under the initial modification, Liberty neither committed to fund, nor 
did it require construction of, any marina facilities. Tr., Vol. 1, pp. 106-07. 
As a condition of the initial LMA, Liberty again required that Witherspoon subordinate its 
Deed of Trust. Ex. K. Consistent with the terms of the initial Subordination Agreement (Ex. H), 
Witherspoon again agreed to subordinate its Deed of Trust to Liberty's Deed of Trust "and any 
renewals or extensions thereof." Ex. K, p. 2. 
Liberty later financed the construction of a second twenty (20) unit condominium complex 
on The Point's property, which, like the first condominium complex, was funded independent of any 
requirement that The Point construct a marina. Tr., Vol. 1, p. 117. Additional Subordination 
Agreements were executed by Witherspoon, at Liberty's request, concurrent with subsequent 
modifications to Liberty's lending arrangement with The Point. Exs. L, M, and 0. By 
subordinating to the Second LMA (Ex. Y), Witherspoon agreed to subordinate to Liberty's Deed of 
Trust and any "renewals or extensions thereof." Ex. L. By subordinating to the Fifth LMA, 
Witherspoon agreed to subordinate to Liberty's Deed of Trust "and any renewals, extensions and/or 
modifications thereof." Ex. M, p. 2 ( emphasis added). By subordinating to the Sixth LMA (Ex. CC), 
Witherspoon again agreed to subordinate to Liberty's Deed of Trust "and any reneYvals, extensions 
8 
and/or modifications thereof." Ex. 0, p. 2 (emphasis added). 
In September of 2010, The Point and Liberty executed the Seventh LMA. Ex. EE. By this 
time, The Point's borrowings from Liberty had increased to $9.29 million. Id. at p. 2. These sums 
included monies advanced to The Point for the construction of a 142 slip marina and floating 
convenience store, with related docks and marina facilities. Liberty funded the construction of the 
marina improvements after funding construction of the two (2) twenty-unit condominium complexes 
and without any prior obligation to do so. Tr., Vol. 1, pp. 105-06, 117. Liberty did not require, as 
a condition of any of its loans to The Point, that The Point record covenants against the property 
establishing a right on the part of any condominium unit owner to use the marina improvements. 
Tr., Vol. 1, pp. 107-08. In fact, Jim Brady, Navigable Waters Specialist with the Idaho Department 
of Lands, testified that The Point's Encroachment Permit and Submerged Lands Lease required that 
all 142 slips be made available to members of the open public as opposed to the owners of any 
condominium units or other portions of The Point's property. Tr., Vol. 1, pp. 71-72. Brady further 
testified that IDL recognized a right on the part of The Point to remove the docks at its election. Id. 
at p. 69. In fact, IDL's Submerged Lands Lease to the marina required the removal of the 
encroachments upon the termination or expiration of the Lease.4 Ex. QQ. 
4Jim Lehr, Vice President for Real Estate, admitted that Green never represented to Liberty 
that the marina improvements would be permanent. Tr., Vol. 1, p. 177. 
Q. He [Green] didn't tell you it [the marina improvements were] permanent, and 
he didn't tell you it was temporary, true? 
A. That's true. 
Q. I mean, in all fairness, you were at Liberty. You reviewed some conceptual 
plans. He made an application for a marina loan, and it was funded, true? 
A. That is true. 
Tr., Vol. 1, p. 177. 
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4. The Specific Language of the Seventh Loan Modification Agreement. 
On September 3, 2010, Liberty recorded its Seventh LMA with The Point. EX. EE. Pursuant 
to the Seventh LMA, Liberty agreed to increase the face amount of The Point's Note to $9,290,000. 
Id. at p. 2. The maturity date of The Point's Note was also extended to June 30, 2011. Id. The 
Seventh LMA provided that the modified principal balance of the Note would remain secured by The 
Point's nine (9) contiguous parcels of property. Ex. EE. 
As a condition precedent to the Seventh LMA, Liberty required that Witherspoon execute 
another Subordination Agreement. Ex. Q. This Subordination Agreement differed marketedly from 
the prior variants. Specifically, the then most recent Subordination Agreement (by which 
Witherspoon had subordinated its Deed of Trust to Liberty's rights under the Sixth LMA), provided: 
That said deed of trust securing said note in favor of Lender [Liberty] and any 
renewals, extensions and/or modifications thereof, shall unconditionally be and 
remain at all time a lien or charge on the property therein described, prior and 
superior to the lien or charge of the deed of trust [of Witherspoon] first above 
mentioned. 
Ex. 0 ( emphasis added). Witherspoon's agreement to subordinate to the Seventh LMA specifically 
deleted and removed any agreement on the part of Witherspoon to subordinate to "any renewals, 
extensions, and/or modifications" that might thereafter be made by or between Liberty and The 
Point. Witherspoon's agreement to subordinate to the Seventh LMA, in contrast to its agreement to 
subordinate to the Sixth LMA, read as follows: 
Ex.Q. 
That said deed of trust [Instrument No. 1975501] securing said note in favor of 
Lender [Liberty] shall unconditionally be and remain at all time a lien or charge on 
the property therein described, prior and superior to the lien or charge of the deed of 
trust first above mentioned. 
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The deletion of any agreement to subordinate to any "renewals, extensions, or modifications" 
to Liberty's Deed of Trust was intentional. Dennis Davis, a principal in Witherspoon, and the party 
who drafted Witherspoon's agreement to subordinate to the Seventh LMA (Ex. Q), testified as 
follows: 
Q. Do you know the circumstances under which the phrase "renewals, 
extensions, or modifications" was deleted from the subordination as to the 
Seventh versus the subordination as to the Sixth? 
A. I would have drafted this document [Witherspoon's Subordination 
Agreement to the Seventh LMA (Ex. Q)], as was practiced. As you can see 
from what we have been going over, leading up to this period of time in 
2010, our firm is incurring greater and greater legal fees and late charges, and 
in the meantime Mr. Green and his entities are incurring greater and greater 
debt in favor of Liberty Bankers .... [W]e were a bit at the end of our rope 
to try to figure out what to do .... We went ahead and agreed to subordinate 
to the Seventh Loan Modification, but it took out of there anything that would 
indicate that we would be obligated to make further extensions, renewals, or 
modifications. 
Tr., Vol. 1 at pp. 194-96.5 
5. Liberty's "Consent Order" With the State of Florida 
Office of Insurance Regulation. 
On September 26, 2007, before executing the Seventh LMA, Liberty entered into a "Consent 
Order" with the State of Florida Office of Insurance Regulation. Ex. PP. The Consent Order 
acknowledged that Liberty's Certificate of Authority from the State of Florida had been suspended 
due to Liberty's failure to comply with Florida's mini um capital and surplus requirements. Id. The 
Consent Order provided in material part: 
5The District Court found Mr. Davis' testimony credible, concluding that Davis, as the author 
of the August 10,2010 Subordination Agreement, "intentionally deleted the 'renewals, extensions, 
and/or modifications' from Subparagraph (1) in order to prevent WKDT from being in a position 
where it would have to agree to future subordination agreements." R., Vol. 6, p. 1193. 
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On new construction loans entered into after the effective date of this Consent 
Order [September 26, 2007], Liberty Bankers shall adhere to the National 
Association oflnsurance Commissioners ... guidelines on construction loans, which 
will limited Liberty Bankers to .25% of admitted assets secured in any one 
construction loan, and 2% of admitted assets in the aggregate. Each construction loan 
existing as of the effective date of this Consent Order that is renewed at loan maturity 
will be considered a new loan and will be subject to inclusion in the aggregate 
limitation of 2% of admitted assets. 
6. The Seventh LMA Creates Compliance Issues Under the 
Consent Order. 
While Liberty's initial loan predated the effective date of the Consent Order, the Seventh 
LMA did not. Tr., Vol. 1 at p. 119 (IL 6-17). Liberty was concerned that the State of Florida would 
consider the entire $9 .29 million balance owed under the Seventh LMA to be a "construction loan," 
thereby placing Liberty in breach of the Consent Order's limitation on the amount of any single 
construction loan and, in addition, impairing Liberty's ability to make other construction loans, 
whether in or out of Florida. Id. at p. 120 (IL 18-24). 
In order to obtain compliance with the terms of the Consent Order, Liberty undertook specific 
efforts to modify the $9 .29 million of indebtedness under the Seventh LMA by creating two new 
notes: a "construction and development loan" in the amount of $2,545,843.31 and a "non-
construction loan" in the amount of $6,744,156.69. Ex. JJ (§§ ( 4),(5), and (24)). 
In February of 2011, before the Eighth LMA had even been drafted, Liberty's Chief 
Accounting Officer (Van Vaughan), with the knowledge of Liberty's president, Bradford Phillips, 
advised the State of Florida that Liberty had reached an agreement with The Point to modify The 
Point's loan to create separate "construction" and "non-construction" loans. In actuality, The Point 
and Liberty never executed such an agreement (the Eighth LMA) until September of 2011, some 
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seven months later. Tr., Vol. 1, p. 123 (IL 15-20); 125 and 126. 
Phillips previously represented, in a February 22, 2011 e-mail, that he did not "trust" the 
State of Florida Office ofinsurance Regulation and that he "wanted to split the Post Falls Note into 
two Notes no matter what Florida says." Ex. KK. Phillips believed that Florida was "going to try 
to penalize us [Liberty] if this isn't corrected." Id. Phillips then personally marked up modifications 
to the Seventh LMA, and forwarded the same to Liberty's legal counsel, so as to generate a proposed 
Eighth LMA which would create separate "construction" and "non-construction" loans, all to 
facilitate compliance with the terms of the Consent Order. Ex. KK; Tr., Vol. 1, pp. 129-130. 
7. Before the Eighth LMA Can Be Executed, The Point's 
Obligation Under the Seventh LMA Matures. 
On June 30, 2011, The Point's obligations under the Seventh LMA matured. Ex. EE. On 
August 18, 2011, Liberty recorded a "Notice of Default," declaring The Point in default under its 
Note and its Deed of Trust as last modified by the Seventh LMA. Ex. FF. Liberty noticed a non-
judicial foreclosure sale, as to all nine (9) contiguous parcels owned by The Point, for December 19, 
2011. R., Vol. 3, p. 660. 
8. With The Seventh LMA in Default, and In Order to 
Obtain Compliance Under the Terms of the Consent 
Order Liberty asks The Point to Execute the Eighth 
LMA. 
On July 6, 2011, Allan Scharton of Liberty wrote to Harry Green, principal for The Point, 
as follows: 
Here are the new loan documents to satisfy the State Insurance Regulators. The loan 
has been broken down into two separate loans. The original loan amount in MOD 7 
has been reduced by the amount of the "new" construction loan portion, so together 
they total the amount in MOD 7. The collateral for the new construction loan is 
Blocks A, D, & E .... The collateral for the original loan portion is all the original 
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land/collateral ... minus Blocks A, D, & E. 
Ex.MM. 
Neither Phillips nor anyone else at Liberty had any discussions with Witherspoon between 
July 1, 2011 and September 8, 2011 wherein Liberty asked Witherspoon to subordinate its Deed of 
Trust to the transaction as recast by the Eighth LMA. Tr., Vol. 1, p. 136 (11. 12-24). In fact, 
Witherspoon never entered into any agreement, written or otherwise, to subordinate its Deed of Trust 
to the modifications accomplished under the Eighth LMA. 
On September 1, 2011, Green signed the Eighth LMA on behalf of The Point and returned 
the same to Phillips. Ex. JJ. Phillips signed the Eighth LMA on September 8, 2011. Id. 
Notwithstanding the full execution of the Eighth LMA, Liberty pressed onward with the Trustee's 
sale it had noticed for December 19, 2011 under the Seventh LMA. At the same time, Phillips 
provided the State of Florida with information representing that Liberty's $9.29 million loan to The 
Point had in fact been broken out into a $2.54 million construction loan and a $6.75 million non-
construction loan, consistent with the terms of the Eighth LMA. Tr., Vol. 1, p. 144 (11. 4-12).6 
6The Consent Order imposed two separate limitations on Liberty's ability to make 
construction loans nationwide. First, Liberty was limited "in any one construction loan" to a loan 
amount of .25% of admitted assets. Id. Second, Liberty's aggregate construction loans could not 
exceed 2% of admitted assets. Id. For present purposes, Liberty's "admitted assets" totaled 
$1,086,000,000. Tr., Vol. 1, p. 124. If Florida considered the entirety of Liberty's $9.29 million loan 
under the Seventh LMA to be a construction loan, then Liberty would be in violation of the Consent 
Order given that no single construction loan could exceed $2,715,000. Through the Eighth LMA, 
Liberty modified the Seventh LMA by creating a stand-alone construction loan of $2.54 million 
(within the dollar limits of the Consent Order), to be secured by Blocks A, D, and E. Ex. JJ at 1123-
24. The remaining loan balance ($6.75 million) was characterized as a "non-construction" loan, 
thereby enabling Liberty to make additional construction loans in a like amount to parties other than 
The Point. Id. at 13. Compliance with the terms of the Consent Order was had solely because of the 
Eighth LMA. Liberty advised the State of Florida, in February of 2011, that The Point loan had in 
fact been segregated even though no such agreement had been made with The Point. Tr., Vol. 1; pp. 
123, 127, and 133. Once the Eighth LMA was actually signed, some seven months later, Liberty 
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9. The Point's Successive Bankruptcy Petitions and 
Liberty's Conflicting Positions. 
On December 19, 2011, prior to the Trustee's sale noticed under the Seventh LMA, The 
Point filed for relief under Chapter 11 of the United States Bankruptcy Code. R., Vol. 3, p. 660. 
Liberty responded by filing suit against Mr. Green on his personal guaranty of The Point's 
obligations under the Seventh LMA (Liberty Bankers Life Insurance Company v. Green, Kootenai 
County Case No. CV-2011-1021). Id. In fact, Liberty's Complaint did not even disclose the 
existence of the Eighth LMA. Id. at p. 63 8. The Greens themselves made the existence of the 
Eighth LMA known to the Court through the allegations contained in their Answer to Liberty's 
Complaint. Id. 
With Liberty's Complaint under the Seventh LMA pending against the Greens in State 
Court, Liberty filed a "Proof of Claim," under penalty of perjury, in The Point's Chapter 11 
proceeding. Ex. VV. Liberty's "Proof of Claim" represented that the "basis for perfection" was a 
recorded Deed of Trust. Id. Attached to the Proof of Claim, to verify and substantiate the same, was 
a copy of the Eighth LMA. 
Liberty thereafter moved the Bankruptcy Court for relief from the automatic stay so as to 
permit it to foreclose under the Eighth LMA. Ex. XX. In support of its motion, Liberty stated that 
its Deed of Trust had been modified on multiple occasions, with the last modification being the 
Eighth LMA of September 8, 2010. Id. at 14 and Exs. 2 and 3. As it had done with its Proof of 
Claim, Liberty appended a copy of the Eighth LMA to its motion. Id. 
Meanwhile, in proceedings held in the Liberty v. Green proceeding, Mr. Phillips, as Liberty's 
again provided the State of Florida with information confirming that the loan to The Point had been 
modified to achieve compliance. Id. at p. 144. 
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Rule 30(b )( 6) designee, testified as follows: 
Q. [D]o you view the terms as contained in the executed Eighth Loan 
Modification Agreement as terms that are - - that Liberty is obligated to 
honor? 
A. I view the loan, the Eighth Loan Modification Agreement, as a binding 
agreement. 
Q. Okay. And my only question is, there wasn't something that Mr. Green said 
he would do that he didn't do that would make then, make the Eighth Loan 
Modification Agreement effective? It was signed, and it says what it says; is 
that - -
A. I would agree with that. 
R., Vol. 3, p. 676. 
On September 6, 2012, The Point's Chapter 11 proceeding was dismissed. R., Vol. 3,p. 660. 
After representing to the Bankruptcy Court, under penalty of perjury, that the Eighth LMA was the 
operative agreement, after admitting under oath that the Eight LMA was "binding," and after 
representing to the State of Florida that the Eighth LMA had been executed to achieve compliance 
with the terms of the Consent Order, Liberty proceeded to re-notice its Trustee's sale under the 
Seventh LMA. Id. 
Prior to the October 8, 2012 sale date, The Point successfully moved to intervene in the 
pending State Court proceeding (Liberty v. Green). The Point also moved for entry of a preliminary 
iajunction enjoining the October 8, 2012 sale on the basis that Liberty was obligated to foreclose in 
conformity with the terms of the Eighth LMA. R., Vol. 3, pp. 643-44. On October 4, 2012, the 
District Court in Liberty v. Green granted The Point's motion for entry of a preliminary iajunction, 
finding "there is a substantial likelihood that the Eighth Loan Modification Agreement applies." Id. 
at p. 657. The Court conditioned the injunction upon The Point's posting of an $875,000 bond (as 
had been requested by Liberty). Id. at pp. 658-59. 
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Unable to post the bond, The Point then filed a second Petition for Relief under Chapter 11. 
R., Vol. 5, p. 1081. Ultimately, The Point's second Chapter 11 petition was dismissed and Liberty 
foreclosed under the Seventh LMA. Ex. GG. A Trustee's Deed, conveying The Point's interest in 
all nine (9) parcels (including Blocks A, D, and E), was recorded on November 14, 2012. Id. 
10. The Applicable Provisions of the Eighth LMA. 
Phillips conceded that Liberty was the party that drafted the Eighth LMA and that Liberty and 
The Point both "got something" for signing it. Tr., Vol. 1, pp. 138-39, 156. 
The Eighth LMA provides as follows: 
• The $9,290,000 outstanding balance under the Seventh LMA (Ex. EE) would 
be modified downward to $6,744,156.69. Ex. JI at ,r,r 1-5. 
• This modified loan balance would be considered a "non-construction" loan 
(Tr., Vol. 1, p. 133) and would remain secured by Liberty's existing Deed of 
Trust. Ex. JI, ,r 23. 
• The remaining balance under the Seventh LMA ($2,545,843.31) would be the 
subject of a new Note, which would be considered to be a "construction and 
development loan." Ex. JI, ,r 24. 
• Liberty would to release Blocks A, D, and E from its existing Deed of Trust. 
Id. Blocks A, D, and E would then be encumbered by a newly-recorded 
Deed of Trust that would secure the "construction loan." Id. 
Liberty and The Point acknowledged that the Eighth LMA represented "the 
final agreement between the parties." Id. at ,r 22. 
Liberty and The Point agreed to "execute such other documents to be filed for 
record as may be necessary or may be required to effect the transactions 
contemplated" in the Eighth LMA. Id. at ,r 18. 
Despite its full execution, and despite recording all prior loan modification agreements with 
The Point, Liberty did not record the Eighth LMA. Phillips testified that Harry Green, on behalf of 
The Point, did not sign and return the Promissory Note and Deed of Trust required under Paragraph 
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24 of the LMA. Tr., Vol. 1, pp. 150-51; Exs. 40 and 41. Harry Green testified that he signed and 
returned to Liberty everything that pertained to the Eighth LMA. Green Depo. at p. 74. Green 
testified that Phillips told him, "If you help me, I will help you." Green further testified that he had 
"every incentive" to return the documents. Id. In denying Liberty's Motion for Reconsideration, the 
District Court specifically held: 
Liberty also argued that it never received the original documents from Harry Green 
which would have been required to foreclose under the Eighth Loan Modification 
Agreement, and therefore the Seventh Loan Modification Agreement was the proper 
agreement under which to foreclose. Harry Green, on the other hand, testified in his 
deposition that he specifically remembered returning the original documents to 
Liberty; additionally, Liberty could have compelled Mr. Green to produce such 
documents but chose not to do so. The Court notes that Mr. Green had nothing to 
lose by returning the original documents to Liberty. Based upon the fact that Mr. 
Green had no stake in the outcome of this case, the Court finds Mr. Green's 
testimony to be credible, and based upon Mr. Phillips' inconsistent positions taken 
throughout the proceedings and based upon Liberty's stake in the outcome of this 
case, the Court finds that Mr. Phillips' testimony lacked credibility. 
R., Vol. 6, pp. 1273. 
11. Why the Eighth LMA Matters. 
The Eighth LMA significantly modified the relative rights of Liberty and Witherspoon in the 
following respects. First, Liberty's Deed of Trust, as modified by the Seventh LMA, encumbered 
all nine (9) of The Point's parcels, including Blocks A, D, andE. Witherspoon's Deed of Trust was, 
by agreement, subordinate to the Seventh LMA. Ex. Q. The Eighth LMA required the release of 
Blocks A, D, and E from Liberty's existing Deed of Trust so that a new Deed of Trust, separately 
securing the segregated construction loan, could be recorded against the same. Ex. JJ, ,r,r 23 and 24. 
Yet Witherspoon did not agree to subordinate its Deed of Trust to the Eighth LMA. Hence, had 
Liberty honored the Eighth LMA, and had it performed in accordance with the terms thereof, 
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Witherspoon's existing Deed of Trust would have been elevated to a first priority lien position as 
to Blocks A, D, and 
Second, Liberty's Deed of Trust encumbering the remainder of The Point's nine (9) parcels 
(exclusive of Blocks A, D, and E), would have stood as security for $6.75 million of non-
construction loan indebtedness. Id. at , 3. By foreclosing under the Seventh LMA, Liberty 
improperly increased the amount of indebtedness secured by these parcels from the $6. 75 million 
provided in the Eighth LMA to the $9.29 million provided in the Seventh LMA. Witherspoon was 
prejudiced in that a properly-noticed sale under the Eighth LMA would have given Witherspoon a 
more realistic opportunity to protect its interests at the sale.7 
To the extent that Liberty suggests a contrary result, based upon the cross-collateralization 
provision of the Eighth LMA, it is mistaken. The Eighth LMA provided that the newly-segregated 
construction loan of $2.54 million and the non-construction loan of$6.75 million would be cross-
collateralized br the entirety of The Point's nine (9) parcels. Ex. JJ,, 25. However, based upon the 
analysis set forth above, the cross-collateralization provision did not alter the relative priorities 
between Liberty and Witherspoon as to Blocks A, D, and E. In other words, as a result of the Eighth 
LMA, Witherspoon held a first lien position on Blocks A, D, and E, followed by Liberty's Deed of 
Trust lien for its $2.54 million construction loan and then Liberty's Deed of Trust lien for its $6.75 
million non-construction loan. As to the remainder of The Point's property, Liberty was to hold a 
first priority Deed of Trust lien to secure its $6.75 million non-construction loan, followed by 
7On November 14, 2012, Liberty successfully made a credit bid of $3.4 million for all nine 
(9) parcels, including Blocks A, D, and E. Ex. GG, p. 17. Liberty has since represented to this Court, 
in its unsuccessful "Motion to Stay" (filed August 27, 2014), that the value of Blocks A, D, and E 
alone is $3.18 million. The amount secured by Witherspoon's Deed of Trust is now in excess of$1.3 
million. See Liberty's "Motion to Stay" at p. 6. 
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Witherspoon's Deed of Trust lien, and then by the Deed of Trust lien to secure Liberty's $2.54 
million construction loan. These priorities naturally result from the undisputed fact that Witherspoon 
never agreed to subordinate to the modifications accomplished by the Eighth LMA. 
II. ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL. 
1. Is Liberty estopped from denying the enforceability of the Eighth Loan Modification 
Agreement? 
2. Whether Liberty's failure to comply with Idaho's statutory requirements renders its 
Trustee's sale void as to Witherspoon? 
3. Whether Liberty's intentional refusal to release Blocks A, D, and E from its existing 
Deed of Trust, consistent with the terms of the Eighth LMA, is of any legal consequence? 
4. Whether the District Court's Judgment is independently affirmable under a third-party 
beneficiary analysis? 
5. Whether the District Court properly held that the Post Falls Landing Marina 
improvements constituted personal property? 
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW. 
The governing standard of review was summarized by this Court as follows: 
On appeal, this Court will not set aside findings of fact unless they are clearly 
erroneous. IRCP 52(a). Appellate review of the decision of the trial court is limited 
to ascertaining whether substantial, competent evidence supports the findings of fact 
and whether the findings of fact support the conclusions of law. Crea v. Crea, 13 5 
Idaho 246, 16 P.3d 922 (2000); Baxter v. Craney, 135 Idaho 166, 16 P.3d 263 (2000). 
When an action is tried to a court without a jury, determinations as to the credibility 
of witnesses, the weight to be given their testimony, its probative effect and 
inferences and conclusions to be drawn therefrom, are all matters within the province 
of the trial court. Idaho Power Co. v. Cogeneration, Inc., 134 Idaho 738, 9 P.3d 1204 
(2000). The trial court's findings of fact will be liberally construed in favor of the 
judgment entered, Heard v. George, 135 Idaho 685, 23 P.3d 147 (2001). This Court 
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exercises free review over conclusions oflaw. Smith v. J. V. Parson Co., 127 Idaho 
937, 941, 908 P.2d 1244, 1248 (1996). 
Estate of Skvorak v. Security Union, 140 Idaho 16, 19, 89 PJd 856 (2004). 
The District Court's Judgment was predicated in part upon its determination on partial 
summary judgment that Liberty was judicially-estopped from denying the enforceability of the 
Eighth LMA. R., Vol. 5, p. 1052. The governing standard ofreview in this regard is as follows: 
On appeal from an order granting a party's motion for summary judgment, this Court 
employs the same standard of review that the trial Court uses in ruling on the motion. 
Banner Life Insurance Co. v. Mark Wallace Dixon Irrevocable Trust, 147 Idaho 117, 
123, 206 P.3d 481, 487 (2009). Summary judgment is appropriate when the 
pleadings, affidavits, and discovery documents before the court indicate that no 
genuine issues of material fact exists and that the moving party is entitled to 
judgment as a matter oflaw. Idaho R. Civ. P. 56( c ); Banner Life Insurance Co., 147 
Idaho at 123, 206 P.3d at 487. The moving party carries the burden of proving the 
absence of a genuine issue of material fact. 
Losee v. Idaho Co., 148 Idaho 219,222,220 P.3d 575 (2009). When an action is tried before a court 
without a jury, the court may, when ruling on a motion for summary judgment, draw probable 
inferences arising from the undisputed evidentiary facts. Id. 
Liberty also filed an unsuccessful post-trial motion to reconsider under IRCP 1 l(a)(2)(B). 
R., Vol. 6, pp. 1204-06; 1271-75. Denial of a motion to reconsider is reviewed for abuse of 
discretion. Rocky Mtn. Power v. Jensen, 154 Idaho 549,557,300 P.3d 1037 (2012). 
IV. ARGUMENT. 
A. The District Court Properly Held that Liberty Was Judicially Estopped 
from Arguing that the Eighth LMA Was Unenforceable. 
The District Court granted partial summary judgment in favor of Witherspoon, estopping 
Liberty "from denying the enforceability of the Eighth Loan Modification Agreement." R., Vol. 5, 
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p. 1052. The application of judicial estoppel is one of discretion. Sword v. Sweet, 140 Idaho 242, 
252, 92 P.3d 492 (2004). The doctrine of judicial estoppel and the policies behind it have been 
described as follows: 
Judicial estoppel, sometimes also known as the doctrine of preclusion of inconsistent 
positions, precludes a party from gaining an advantage by taking one position, and 
then seeking a second advantage by taking an incompatible position. 
Id. (quoting Rissetto v. Plumbers and Steamfitters Local 343, 94 F.3d 597,600 (9th Cir. 1996)). 
"Judicial estoppel is intended to prevent a litigant from playing fast and loose with the 
Courts." Heinze v. Bauer, 145 Idaho 232,235, 178 P.3d 597 (2008) (citing Rissetto, 94 F.3d at 601). 
Put another way, "Judicial estoppel is intended to prevent abuse of the judicial process by deliberate 
shifting of positions to suit the exigencies of a particular action." Heinze v. Bauer, 145 Idaho at 235 
(citing McKay v. Owens, 130 Idaho 148, 159, 937 P.2d 1222 (1997)). Because the doctrine of 
judicial estoppel "is intended to protect the dignity of the judicial process, it is an equitable doctrine 
invoked by a court at its discretion." Sword v. Sweet, 140 Idaho at 252 (quoting Rissetto, 94 F.3d 
at 601) ( additional citations omitted). 
Liberty argues that the District Court abused its discretion by estopping Liberty from denying 
the enforceability of the Eighth LMA. In this regard, Liberty makes two arguments. First, Liberty 
claims that it did not take an inconsistent position with respect to the "enforceability" of the Eighth 
LMA. Second, Liberty claims that it did not obtain any "advantage" or "consideration" from the 
inconsistent positions it took with respect to the Eighth LMA. Both arguments should be rejected. 
For Liberty to suggest to this Court that the positions it has taken as to the "enforceability" 
of the Eighth LMA have been consistent rings rather hollow. In this regard, the Court should 
consider the following: 
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In February of 2011, prior to the execution of the Eighth LMA, Liberty 
advised the State of Florida that it had reached agreement with The Point to 
modify The Point's loan so as to create separate "construction" and "non-
construction" loans. Tr., Vol. 1, pp. 123, 125, and 126. 
On July 6, 2011, with The Point in default under the Seventh LMA, Liberty 
represented to The Point that execution of the Eighth LMA was necessary "to 
satisfy the State Insurance Regulators." Ex. MM. 
• After execution of the Eighth LMA, Liberty confirmed to the State of Florida 
that The Point's loan had been modified into separate "construction" and 
"non-construction" loans. Tr., Vol. 1, p. 144. 
Liberty then filed its Complaint in Liberty v. Green, representing to the 
Kootenai County District Court that the Seventh LMA was the governing 
agreement. R., Vol. 5, pp. 955 (ill 0), 975-98. 
• On April 18, 2012, Liberty filed its "Proof of Claim" with the United States 
Bankruptcy Court in The Point's Chapter 11 proceeding, stating under 
penalty of perjury that the Eighth LMA governed. Ex. VV. 
• On July 12, 2012, Liberty filed its "Motion for Relief from the Automatic 
Stay" in The Point's Chapter 11 proceeding, representing that the governing 
agreement for purposes of foreclosure was the Eighth LMA. Ex. XX. 
• Liberty's Rule 30(b )(6) designee testified in Liberty v. Green that the Eighth 
LMA was "a binding agreement." R., Vol. 3, p. 676. 
• Once The Point's Chapter 11 had been dismissed, Liberty argued to the 
Kootenai County District Court that the Seventh LMA governed. R., Vol. 3, 
pp. 636-60. 
Liberty suggests to this Court, in light of the foregoing statements, including statements made under 
penalty of perjury, Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 11, and IRCP 11, that the Eighth LMA really doesn't matter. 
With all due respect, the record shows that Liberty has shifted its positions whenever Liberty deemed 
it convenient to do so. 8 
8Liberty attempts to downplay the representations it made to the U.S. Bankruptcy Court "by 
attaching the agreement [the Eighth LMA] to its fLiberty' s] Motion for Relief .... " See Appellant's 
Brief at p. 36. In actuality, Liberty's representations to the Bankruptcy Court were made under 
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As the District Court in Liberty v. Green noted before Liberty's foreclosure sale, "If the 
Eighth Loan Modification Agreement applies, it will effect how foreclosure is performed." R., Vol. 
3, p. 649. Further the Court observed, "The Point claims that the Eighth Loan Modification 
Agreement divided the existing indebtedness into two separate loans and as such, Liberty was and 
is required to proceed with a non-judicial foreclosure under two separate obligations, rather than 
one." Id. at p. 648. Phillips admitted at trial that under the Eighth LMA, Parcels A, D, and E were 
"to be released from the existing Deed of Trust before the new Deed of Trust [ under the Eighth 
LMA] was put on .... " Tr., Vol. 1, pp. 135-36. 
Liberty's inconsistent positions allowed Liberty to obtain two advantages: one under the 
terms of the Florida Consent Order and one related to the wrongful manner by which Liberty 
conducted its foreclosure sale. As to the State of Florida, Liberty's representations that The Point's 
loan had been segregated into "construction" and "non-construction" components, consistent with 
the Eighth LMA, allowed Liberty to put its concerns with the State of Florida to rest. Tr., Vol. 1, 
p. 139. Further, Liberty was able to bring its loan with The Point into compliance with the terms of 
the Consent Order and to make additional construction loans to parties other than The Point. See 
Section I.C.8, supra, at footnote 6.9 
penalty of perjury. Ex. VV. 
9Liberty claims that its inconsistent representations to the State of Florida are insufficient to 
support the District Court's decision to judicially estop Liberty from denying the enforceability of 
the Eighth LMA. This Court has previously held that judicial estoppel does not preclude 
inconsistent positions taken before an administrative agency. See, ~. Sadid v. Idaho State 
University, 154 Idaho 88, 96,294 P.3d 1100 (2013). However, under the terms of the Consent Order 
at issue, Liberty "knowingly and voluntarily waive[d] all rights to challenge or to contest [the] 
Consent Order, in any forum now or in the future available to it, including the right to any 
administrative proceeding, circuit or federal court action, or any appeal." Ex. PP. Further, even if 
misrepresentations to an administrative agency do not alone support the application of the doctrine 
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Liberty's inconsistent positions also conferred an advantage through the very foreclosure 
process at issue. After representing to the Bankruptcy Court that the Eighth LMA applied, Liberty 
did an about-face, and argued to the District Court in Liberty v. Green that the Seventh LMA 
governed. Based in part upon those representations, and the issues arising therefrom, the Court in 
Libertv v. Green conditioned entry of its injunction of a sale under the Seventh LMA on The Point's 
posting of an $875,000 bond in three days, a factually unachievable condition. R., Vol. 3, pp. 658-
59. Liberty was then able to proceed to sale under the Seventh LMA without re-noticing the same 
in conformity with the Eighth LMA. Phillips did not dispute the same: 
Q. When I asked you [Phillips] that previously, before this lawsuit [Liberty v. 
Witherspoon] had been filed, I asked you as the designee of Liberty why the 
Deed of Trust called out for in the Eighth Loan Modification Agreement as 
to Parcels A, D, and E had not been followed-up with and you indicated that 
the loan had already been declared in default and the property posted for sale? 
A. That is true. 
Tr., Vol. 1, pp. 157-58. By foreclosing under the Seventh LMA, Liberty obtained an advantage by 
improperly increasing the amount of indebtedness secured by The Point's nine (9) parcels ( exclusive 
of Blocks A, D, and E) from the $6. 75 million of non-commercial loan indebtedness under the 
Eighth LMA to the $9.29 million in debt under the Seventh LMA. See Section I.C.11, supra. 
Liberty significantly inflated the amount of indebtedness secured by The Point's nine (9) parcels 
(inclusive of Blocks A, D, and E). 
While Witherspoon suggests that the facts more than support the District Court's exercise 
ofits discretion to apply the doctrine of judicial estoppel, even if the District Court erred (a point not 
of judicial estoppel, those misrepresentations constitute independent evidence which, when viewed 
as a whole, supports the District Court's factual finding that the Eighth LMA and all ancillary 
documents had been fully-executed and were binding in accordance with their terms. 
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conceded), the error is of no significance on appeal. In response to Liberty's Motion for 
reconsideration, the District Court found, as a matter of fact, that the Eighth LMA and associated 
documents had been fully-executed and, on that additional basis, it estopped Liberty from denying 
enforceability of the same. R., Vol. 6, pp. 1273-74. Substantial and competent evidence supports 
the District Court's finding of fact. Crea v. Crea, 135 Idaho 246, 16 P.3d 922 (2000). 10 
B. Liberty's Failure to Comply With the Statutory Requirements 
Governing Non-Judicial Foreclosure Sales Renders its Sale Void as to 
Witherspoon. 
1. The Legal Propriety of Liberty's Trustee's Sale was an 
Issue Before the District Court. 
On appeal, Liberty contends,"[ A ]pparently WKDT is now going to argue that the foreclosure 
was wrongful." See Appellant's Brief at p. 30. In actuality, in support of its claims, Liberty alleged 
that it had foreclosed under the Seventh LMA in compliance with Idaho law. R., Vol. 1, p. 14. 
Witherspoon affirmatively denied that Liberty's sale had been conducted in compliance with LC. § 
45-1501, et seq. Id. at pp. 116-18. 
2. The Terms of the Eighth LMA Bind Liberty in Law and 
in Fact. 
As argued above, the District Court properly estopped Liberty from escaping the legal effect 
of the Eighth LMA. Of equal importance, the District Court held that the parties' full execution of 
the Eighth LMA and all associated documents, including the new construction loan and the new 
10The District Court's determination that the Eighth LMA bound Liberty is further supported 
under the doctrine of quasi-estoppel. See,~. Atwood v. Smith, 143 Idaho 110, 114, 138 P.3d 310 
(2006). The doctrine of quasi-estoppel applies when the offending party (Liberty) takes a 
contradictory position and, as a result, either (1) gained an advantage or caused a disadvantage to the 
other party, or (2) it would be unconscionable to permit the offending party to maintain an 
inconsistent position from one by which he has already derived a benefit. Id. 
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Deed of Trust, was supported by the evidence admitted at trial. R., Vol. 6, pp. 1273-74. Substantial 
evidence supports the District Court's finding. Simply put, the execution of the Eighth LMA and 
the documents described therein are adjudicated facts. 11 
3. Liberty's Trustee's Sale Failed to Comply With Idaho 
Law. 
Non-judicial foreclosures require strict compliance with the statutory provisions governing 
the same. Federal Horne Loan Mortgage Corp. v. Appel, 143 Idaho 42, 137 P.3d, 429 (2006). 
Section 45-1506(4)(b) requires that the notice of Trustee's sale describe the property covered by the 
trust deed. Because Liberty was bound by the Eighth LMA, the Notice of Sale under the Seventh 
LMA failed to comply with Section 45-1506(4)(b) in that it described all nine (9) of The Point's 
parcels as being subject to the singular Deed of Trust described in the Seventh LMA. Put another 
way, under the Eighth LMA, Parcels A, D, and E were to have been the subject of a separate Deed 
of Trust, securing $2.55 million of indebtedness, with only the remainder of the nine (9) original 
parcels standing as security under the existing Deed of Trust. Ex. FF. 
Liberty's Notice also failed to comply with Section 45-1506( 4)( d) which requires the accurate 
specification of the default for which the foreclosure is made. Liberty's Notice of Default alleged 
a default under the Seventh LMA (Instrument No. 2280353000). Exs. FF; EE. In actuality, the 
Seventh LMA had been superseded by the Eighth LMA. Ex. JJ, 122. Liberty's Notice of Default 
similarly failed to accurately identify the amounts of both of the obligations separately secured by 
11 Liberty argued to the District Court that it "was entitled to refuse to direct the Trustee to 
execute a partial reconveyance" of Blocks A, D, and E, as provided by the Eighth LMA. R., Vol. 
6, p. 1235. The District Court properly rejected Liberty's contention, as a matter of both fact and 
law, finding that Liberty could not rely on the validity of the Eighth LMA in one breath, and then 
refuse to perform thereunder (by releasing Blocks A, D, and E before recording the nev,r Deed of 
Trust to secure the $2.55 million construction loan) at the same time. R., Vol. 6, p. 1193. 
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the two Deeds of Trust required under the Eighth LMA. See LC. § 45-1506(4)(e). 
These defects rendered Liberty's sale void as to Witherspoon given the District Court's 
finding that while Witherspoon had agreed to subordinate its lien to Liberty's original Deed of Trust, 
as modified by the Seventh LMA, but not to the Deed of Trust lien created by Paragraph 24 of the 
Eighth LMA (which described Blocks A, D, and E). R., Vol. 6, p. 1194. 12 
4. The District Court Properly Entered Judgment by 
Enforcing the Eighth LMA in Accordance with its Terms. 
Finding that Liberty and The Point had fully-executed the Eighth LMA, and finding that 
Witherspoon had intentionally limited its agreement to subordinate so as to exclude the 
modifications accomplished under the Eighth LMA, the District Court properly entered judgment 
in a manner consistent with the terms of the Eighth LMA. Specifically, since Witherspoon had not 
agreed to subordinate its lien to the Deed of Trust described in Paragraph 24 of the Eighth LMA, and 
since Liberty was determined to have fully-executed the Eighth LMA and to otherwise be estopped 
from denying the obligations and benefits thereunder, the Court found that Witherspoon's senior lien 
held first priority as to Blocks A, D, and E. 
In considering the impact of WKDT's senior lien on Liberty's Trustee's 
Deed, the Court is mindful that"[ o ]rdinarily, a junior mortgagee may foreclose first, 
with the purchaser taking subject to the senior's lien." First Security Bank ofidaho, 
N.A. v. Stauffer, 112 Idaho 133, 140, 730 P.2d 1053 (Ct. App. 1986). A reading of 
§ 45-1508 together with§ 45-1506(2) also supports a conclusion that while Liberty 
12Liberty's failure to comply with the mandatory provisions ofI.C. § 45-1506( 4) renders any 
third-party beneficiary analysis moot. Simply put, the existence and binding nature of the Eighth 
LMA, whether determined in law or in fact, supports the conclusion that the Agreement was fully-
executed, supported by substantial consideration, and simply ignored by Liberty for the sake of 
expediency and convenience in facilitating the already-noticed sale under the Seventh LMA. 
Whether or not Witherspoon was an intended third-party beneficiary of the Eighth LMA is irrelevant 
because the Eighth LMA was in fact executed and the sale did not take place in conformity 
therewith, thereby violating the statutory provisions governing the conduct of trustee's sales. 
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was authorized to foreclose its junior lien with respect to Parcels A, D, and E, Liberty 
as the credit-bid purchaser took Parcels A, D, and E subject to WKDT' s first priority 
lien. 
R., Vol. 6, pp. 195-96. 
5. Liberty's Trustee's Sale Was Void as to Witherspoon. 
Liberty cites a Duke Law Journal article for the following propositions. First, some defects 
in a foreclosure sale "are so substantial and prejudicial as to render the foreclosure sale void." See 
Grant S. Nelson & Dale A. Whitman, Reforming Foreclosure: The Uniform Non-Judicial 
Foreclosure Act, 53 Duke L.J. 1399, 1499-1502 (2004). Second, some defects, "normally 
irregularities in the execution of a foreclosure sale," render "a sale voidable rather than void." Third, 
some defects "are so inconsequential as to have no effect on the validity of a foreclosure sale." 
Against this background, Liberty suggests that a sale noticed under a superseded deed of trust 
(the Seventh LMA), contrary to the terms of modified deeds of trust arising under an agreement (the 
Eighth LMA) acknowledged as binding under penalty of perjury, is something so benign and 
pedestrian as to make the sale valid. In support of its position, Liberty cites New Phase Investments, 
LLC v. Jarvis, 153 Idaho 207,280 P.3d 710 (2012). 
The holding in New Phase Investments does not resolve the issue at bar. In New Phase 
Investments, this Court held that I.C. § 32-912 was enacted for the protection of the marital 
community, and that a deed of trust signed by one spouse was not susceptible to collateral attack by 
a subsequent lienor. The holding does not suggest that a Trustee's sale is immune from collateral 
attack when the trust beneficiary proceeds to sale under a knowingly superseded deed of trust that 
was specifically procured to obtain compliance with the terms of a binding Consent Order. As a 
result, Liberty proceeded with one foreclosure sale, for the total amount claimed 0vving, rather than 
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with two sales under two separate loans. Simply put, Liberty obtained all of the benefits of the Eighth 
LMA and then wilfully chose to violate Idaho's statutory requirements by acting as if the Eighth 
LMA never existed. For Liberty to now claim that these defects are "so inconsequential" as to render 
the sale voidable, if not valid, is disingenuous. With all due respect, one wonders what showing 
would be necessary to render a Trustee's sale void if Liberty's conduct is deemed insufficient. 
Regardless, if the sale is deemed voidable, as opposed to void, Liberty hardly qualifies as "a 
purchaser in good faith for value at ... such sale." See LC.§ 45-1508. 
Section 45-1508 provides that any failure to comply with the provisions of§ 45-1506 shall 
not effect the validity of the sale in favor of a purchaser in good faith for value at the sale. Liberty 
specifically knew, prior to pressing onward with a sale under the Seventh LMA, whether for the sake 
of expediency or otherwise, that there was a substantial likelihood that the Eighth LMA would be 
determined to govern. R., Vol. 3, p. 657. Liberty also knew of The Point's delivery of all documents 
under the terms of the Eighth LMA and of Liberty's utter disregard for the same. Under these 
circumstances, Liberty is not a good faith purchaser entitled to the protections of§ 45-1508. See, 
U, Taylor v. Just, 138 Idaho 137, 59 P.3d 308 (2002).13 
13Liberty also seeks absolution under§ 45-1508 which provides that the failure to give notice 
in accordance with § 45-1506 "shall not affect the validity of the sale as to persons so notified nor 
as to any such persons having actual knowledge of the sale." The Notice of sale provided to 
Witherspoon (Ex. VV) contained the infirmities for which Witherspoon sought relief, including 
Liberty's failure to proceed under the appropriate Deed of Trust and its failure to accurately recite 
the indebtedness encompassed by the two separate Deeds of Trust required under the Eighth LMA. 
It strains credulity for Liberty to essentially argue that notice of an infirm sale, under a knowingly 
misrepresented Deed of Trust, is not thereafter subject to challenge. The Notice itself failed to 
conform with the requirements of Idaho law, and was patently inconsistent with admissions made 
by Liberty before the United States Bankruptcy Court. 
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C. Liberty's Intentional Failure to Release Blocks A, D, and E from Its 
Existing Deed of Trust Is of No Legal Consequence. 
1. The Eighth LMA, According to Its Terms, Released Liberty's 
Original Deed of Trust as to Blocks A, D, and E. 
The District Court found that Liberty and The Point had fully-executed the Eighth LMA and 
the documents associated therewith. R., Vol. 6, pp. 1271-74. The Eighth LMA, which "represents 
the parties' final agreement," creates the $2.55 million construction loan necessary to satisfy the 
terms of the Consent Order, and further provides that said Note will be: 
Secured by ... a deed of trust [ on Blocks A, D, and E]. Since [Blocks A, D, and E 
are] part of the property [encumbered by Liberty's existing Deed of Trust], Lender 
[Liberty] shall execute a Partial Release of Lien to release [Blocks A, D, and E] from 
the Deed of Trust securing the [ original] Note modified by this Agreement in 
exchange for a principal payment of $750,000 which shall be advanced by Lender 
under the [$2.55 million] Promissory Note. 
Ex. JJ, 124 ( emphasis added). Liberty intentionally failed to record the referenced Release and the 
Deed of Trust on Blocks A, D, and E solely for convenience, given that it had already noticed a 
default and sale under the superseded Seventh LMA. Tr., Vol. 1, pp. 157-58. The District Court 
made a factual finding, supported by substantial evidence, that Witherspoon had not agreed to 
subordinate its Deed of Trust to the new Deed of Trust required under the Eighth LMA. R., Vol. 6, 
p. 1193. 
In reliance upon Idaho's recording statutes (LC.§§ 55-811 and 55-812), Liberty claims that 
the District Court "ignored the order of recording and the legal affect of WKDT's Subordination 
Agreement and legally erred by affording priority to WKDT through the judgment." See Appellant's 
Brief at p. 23. 14 This Court should reject Liberty's argument. 
14Liberty did not cite either statutory provision as a basis for relief in its Trial Brief or in its 
Memorandum in support of its Motion for Reconsideration. R., Vol. 6, pp. 1158-79; pp. 1230-41. 
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Section 55-811 provides that"[ e ]very conveyance of real property ... recorded as prescribed 
by law, from the time it is filed with the recorder for record, is constructive notice of the contents 
thereof to subsequent purchasers and mortgagee." Section 5 5-812 provides that"[ e ]very conveyance 
of real property ... is void as against any subsequent purchaser or mortgagee of the same property, 
or any part thereof, in good faith and for a valuable consideration, whose conveyance is first duly 
recorded." Liberty argues that both statutes should be enforced in accordance with their plain and 
ordinary meaning, thereby insulating Liberty's claim of title upon a Trustee's Deed resulting from 
a foreclosure under the Seventh LMA. These arguments should be rejected. 
First, Idaho's recording statutes must be read in tandem with the statutory provisions 
applicable to non-judicial sales (LC. § 45-1501, et seq.). As set forth in Section IV.B, supra, 
Liberty's foreclosure under the Seventh LMA failed to comply with the statutory requirements of 
§ 45-1506( 4). Notwithstanding the same, Liberty essentially argues that it could intentionally 
foreclose under a superseded agreement, rendering the sale voidable if not void as to Witherspoon, 
and nonetheless prevail because it recorded its Trustee's Deed first. Such a result would be to reward 
Liberty for perpetuating a falsehood for the sake of expediency. Further, such a result would run 
contrary to the equally-mandator; provisions of§ 45-1506(4). 
Second, the recording statutes relied upon by Liberty can only be invoked by a good faith 
purchaser. See § 55-812. When a purchaser (such as Liberty) has actual knowledge of a prior 
interest, it makes no difference whether the prior interest was properly acknowledged and recorded. 
Farm Bureau Finance Co. v. Carney, 100 Idaho 745,605 P.2d, 509 (1980). This is particularly true 
This Court will not typically consider an argument raised for the first time on appeal. See,~' KEB 
Enterprises, L.P. v Smedley. 140 Idaho 746, 752, 101 P.3d 690 (2004). 
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where, as here, Liberty had knowledge based upon the Court's finding in Liberty v. Green, made 
prior to Liberty's Trustee's sale, that "there is a substantial likelihood that the Eighth Loan 
Modification Agreement applies." R., Vol. 3, p. 657. The caselaw relied upon by Liberty does not 
suggest a contrary result. 
In International Mortgage Bank v. Whitaker, 44 Idaho 178,255 P. 903 (1927), Whitaker 
encumbered 160 acres of land with a mortgage to secure $15,000 owed the Bank. Whitaker 
subsequently conveyed half of the acreage to Frank, who agreed to pay $7,000 of the $15,000 then-
owed to the Bank. 
Whitaker thereafter made improvements to the Frank property, for which Whitaker wasn't 
paid. Frank in tum executed a mortgage to the Bank, to secure that portion of the $15,000 
indebtedness he had assumed in purchasing his 80 acres. Even so, the original $15,000 mortgage 
remaining of record. After recordation of the mortgage Frank had granted to the Bank, Whitaker 
recorded a lien for the unpaid materials he had previously furnished to Frank. 
The Bank subsequently brought suit to foreclose on its $15,000 mortgage. Whitaker claimed 
that the $15,000 mortgage on the Frank property (which Whitaker had since liened), had been 
released and replaced by Frank's $6,500 mortgage. The Court rejected Whitaker's argument, finding 
that the $15,000 original mortgage continued to bind the property. Since the $15,000 mortgage was 
of record when Whitaker first furnished materials, it was deemed prior in time and right. 
The holding in International Mortgage Bank v. Whitaker, is distinguishable. Specifically, 
the Court therein found "that it was agreed that the $15,000 mortgage would not be released or 
discharged of record, or otherwise" until certain specific terms and conditions were fully performed 
and complied with. 255 P. at 904. The Court's finding was based upon the specific fact that the 
33 
Bank had not agreed to release the prior $15,000 mortgage by the taking and recordation of the 
$6,500 Frank mortgage. 255 at 905. Those are not the facts at bar. 
Liberty, unlike the Bank in International Mortgage Bank v. Whitaker, specifically agreed to 
"execute a Partial Release of Lien" to release Blocks A, D, and E from Liberty's original Deed of 
Trust, and to then encumber the same with a new Deed of Trust. Ex. JJ., ,I 24. As such, the facts 
at bar are clearly different from those in International Mortgage Bank v. Whitaker. 15 
Liberty's reliance on Resolution Trust Corp. v. Kemp, 951 F.2d 657 (5th Cir. 1992) is equally 
misplaced. In Resolution Trust, a developer secured an obligation owed to Kingfisher with a deed 
of trust. The developer subsequently borrowed monies from a second lender (Hiawatha), securing 
that loan with a deed of trust on the same property. Kingfisher and Hiawatha executed several 
subordination agreements whereby Kingfisher subordinated its lien to Hiawatha's lien. Under the 
subordination agreements, Kingfisher agreed to partial releases oflots from Whittle' s property under 
certain stated conditions. Resolution Trust succeeded to Kingfisher's position. 
Ultimately, the parties were aligned with Resolution as plaintiff, pursuingjudicial foreclosure 
under the Kingfisher deed of trust. The defendants were two purchasers of lots from the developer 
who had failed to obtain releases under Kingfisher's deed of trust when they purchased their lots. 
The two lot owners argued that the Resolution/Kingfisher liens were "automatically released" 
when sold by Whittle. Applying Texas law, the Fifth Circuit disagreed. The court noted that there 
were no releases of record recorded prior to the lot owners' purchases or as conditions thereof. The 
15The Court in International Mortgage Bank v. Whitaker noted the general rule "that the 
renewal of the evidence of a debt does not, in the absence of an agreement between the parties, 
constitute in-law payment of the old debt." 255 P. at 906 (citation omitted). The Eighth LMA, at 
Paragraph 24, clearly evidences a specific agreement which negates the general rule. Ex. JJ. 
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result urged by the lot owners was barred by terms of instruments of public record when the lot 
owners acquired title. Such are not the facts at bar. 
While the lot owners in Resolution Trust could demonstrate no obligation on the part of 
Resolution/Kingfisher to retroactively release its lien, in this case Liberty was obligated to release 
its Deed of Trust as to Blocks A, D, and E, both in fact and in contract. Such a result naturally flows 
from the District Court's finding that the Eighth LMA bound Liberty in accordance with the terms 
thereof. Witherspoon's subordination was not a "blanket subordination" as was the case in 
Resolution Trust. Rather, Witherspoon's subordination to the Seventh LMA specifically and 
intentionally omitted any obligation to subordinate to any "modifications" to the Seventh LMA. Ex. 
Q. Witherspoon intentionally limited its subordination to exclude modifications to the Seventh LMA 
and the District Court so held. R., Vol. 6, p. 1194. To accept Liberty's argument would require a 
finding that the Eighth LMA was never intended to be binding upon Liberty, yet Liberty's own 
admissions suggest otherwise. 
2. Under the Eighth LMA, the Restructuring of The Point's Notes 
and the Taking of a New Deed of Trust Operated to Release 
Liberty's Original Deed of Trust as to Blocks A, D, and E. 
Liberty argues that under Idaho law, the substitution of a loan and a new mortgage does not 
impair or destroy the lien of the original mortgage unless that was the parties' intent. Western Loan 
& Savings Company v. Kendrick State Bank, 13 Idaho 331, 90 P. 112 (1907). In reviewing the 
terms of the Eighth LMA, and the context within which it was entered, the District Court found, as 
a matter of fact, that Liberty would lose its priority as to Blocks A, D, and E upon the full 
performance of its obligations under the Eighth LMA. That finding should be sustained on appeal. 
Liberty cites numerous provisions of the Eighth LMA in support of its argument. It is 
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noteworthy that Liberty does not cite Paragraph 24, which provides: 
[The Point] is executing construction loan documents evidenced by a note in the 
original principal amount of $2,545,843.31, payable to Lender [the construction 
loan], secured by, among other things, a deed of trust encumbering [Blocks A, D, and 
E]. Since [Blocks A, D, and E are] part of the property [encumbered by Liberty's 
existing deed of trust], Lender [Liberty] shall execute a Partial Release of Lien to 
release [Blocks A, D, and E] from the [original Liberty] Deed of Trust securing the 
note modified by this agreement in exchange for a principal payment of $750,000 
which shall be advanced by [Liberty] under the $2,545,843.31 [ construction loan]. 
Ex. JJ ( emphasis added). The agreement clearly evidences an intent that the original Deed of Trust, 
as to Blocks A, D, and E, would be "released" in order for a new Deed of Trust to be placed on the 
same, all to achieve compliance under the terms of the Consent Order. Because Witherspoon did 
not agree to subordinate to any subsequent modifications to the Seventh LMA, upon the release of 
Blocks A, D, and E, and before the placing of a new Deed of Trust on the same, Witherspoon's Deed 
of Trust was elevated to a first priority lien. 
The holding in Western Loan & Savings, supra, does not suggest a contrary result. In that 
case, the Taylors granted a bank a mortgage on a lot ofland to secure a $450 loan. 13 Idaho at 333. 
The Taylors then sold the lot to the Normolyes, but the $450 mortgage remained. Id. Two years 
later, the Normolyes borrowed $3,900 from a second bank, and granted that bank a mortgage on the 
same lot. The first bank brought an action to foreclose its $450 mortgage. The action was settled 
when the N ormolyes gave the first bank a new mortgage on the lot for $410, representing the balance 
remaining on the original Taylor loan. 
The first bank then brought an action to foreclose the $410 mortgage. The second bank 
claimed that its $3,900 mortgage was prior to the first bank's $410 mortgage. On rehearing, the 
Supreme Court remanded the matter for further evidentiary proceedings in order to determine, as a 
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matter of fact, whether or not the $410 mortgage was intended as a renewal and continuation of the 
$450 mortgage. In this case, the trial court held that the language of the Eighth LMA, once 
performed, as a factual finding, elevated Witherspoon's Deed of Trust through the modifications 
described in Paragraph 8 of the Eighth LMA. 
The case of Walker v. Farmers' Bank of Kendrick, 41 Idaho 279,238 P.2d 968 (1925) does 
not suggest a contrary result. In Walker, Kuikendall gave the bank a note for $2,800, securing the 
same with a mortgage. The bank subsequently acquired another note that Kuikendall owed a third-
party creditor. The bank combined the sums it was directly owed under its note with the sums owed 
under the note it had taken by assignment, and prepared "a new mortgage," encumbering the same 
property. The new mortgage was never recorded, and the first mortgage was not released of record. 
Kuinkendall filed for bankruptcy, and his creditors sought to set aside the bank's mortgage. 
The Court declined to do so, finding that the original mortgage had never been released of record and 
that the second umecorded mortgage, although not binding on creditors, did not in and of itself 
effectuate a release of the first mortgage. Those are not the facts at bar. As set forth above, 
Paragraph 24 of the Eighth LMA specifically requires the release of Blocks A, D, and E, in exchange 
for a principal payment of $750,000 to be advanced under the construction loan. When the Eighth 
LMA is enforced, in accordance with the terms drafted by Liberty, Witherspoon's Deed of Trust lien 
is elevated to a first position as to Blocks A, D, and E. The District Court's factual finding in this 
regard is case specific and distinguishable from the authorities cited by Liberty. 16 
16Liberty argues that"[ a] court of equity will look straight to the substance of the transaction 
rather than give heed to the mere form which it may assume." American Savings Bank & Trust 
Company v. Helgesen, 122 P. 26, 27 (Wash. 1912). He who seeks equity must do equity. Hobbs 
v. First Interstate Bank ofidaho. N.A., 109 Idaho 990, 992, 712 P.2d 691 (Ct. App. 1985). In light 
of Liberty's conduct, equity would suggest that the Eighth LMA be enforced as urged by 
37 
3. The District Court Properly Held, as an Alternative Basis, that 
I.C. §45-108 Operated to Release Blocks A, D, and E From 
Liberty's Original Deed of Trust. 
The District Court found additional (although not required) support under I.C. §45-108. The 
Court determined that the Eighth LMA, as to Parcels A, D, and E, could constitute the basis for "a 
lien created by contract," to take immediate effect as security for the new "construction loan" which 
was "not then in existence."17 The Court was giving Liberty the benefit of the security interest 
created under the new Deed of Trust which was required under Paragraph 24 of the Eighth LMA. 
Section 45-108 notes that those with prior perfected security interests are not divested of their 
priority based upon a contractually-created lien for a future advance under I.C. §45-108. The Eighth 
LMA, at Paragraph 24, obligated Liberty to make a future advance of $750,000 under the segregated 
"construction loan." Based upon the District Court's finding, following the release of Parcels A, D, 
and E, Witherspoon's Deed of Trust was elevated into a first lien position with Liberty being entitled 
to a "lien created by contract," under the Eighth LMA, in the absence of the execution and 
recordation of the new Deed of Trust specifically required by the Eighth LMA. 18 
Witherspoon. 
17Section 45-108 provides, "A lien may be created by contract, to take immediate effect, as 
security for the performance of obligations not then in existence, which lien, if not invalid on other 
grounds, shall be valid as against all persons." 
18Liberty argues on appeal that a deed of trust lien is not "a lien" for purposes of Section 45-
108. Liberty relies upon Idaho Code §45-101, which defines a lien as "a charge imposed in some 
mode other than by a transfer in trust upon specific property by which it is made security for the 
performance of an act." However, the "transfer in trust" mentioned in §45-101 is one which creates 
a trust and which absolutely conveys title from the grantor, and not a deed of trust which 
hypothecates the property for the payment of the debt. Brown v. Bryan, 6 Idaho 1, 51 P. 995 (1896). 
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D. The District Court's Judgment is Independently Sustainable Under a 
Third-Party Beneficiary Analysis. 
Because it held that Liberty was bound by the Eighth LMA, and because it found that Liberty 
had failed to foreclose in conformity therewith, the Court concluded that Witherspoon's claim that 
it was an intended beneficiary of the Eighth LMA had been rendered moot. R., Vol. 6, p. 1201. 
Liberty argues that the District Court committed error, suggesting that Witherspoon could have only 
benefitted under the Eighth LMA if the Court had determined that Witherspoon was a third-party 
beneficiary under the same. This Court should reject Liberty's argument. 
Witherspoon was entitled to the benefits of the Eighth LMA because Liberty admitted that 
the Agreement was binding and enforceable in accordance with its terms, and because the District 
Court held that Liberty, by benefitting from the Eighth LMA, was estopped from refusing to perform 
in accordance with the terms. This finding was made independent of any third-party beneficiary 
analysis. Further, this finding was predicated upon an adjudicated fact that the Eighth LMA was 
executed and the rule that strict compliance must be had with Idaho's non-judicial foreclosure 
statutory requirements. 
Should this Court disagree, and should it determine that a third-party beneficiary analysis is 
necessary, then the Court should consider the following. The Eighth LMA specifically provides that 
it "shall inure to the benefit of the parties' respective heirs, representatives, successors and assigns." 
Ex. JJ, ~ 21. The Agreement was drafted by Liberty (Ex. KK), and as such should be interpreted 
against Liberty. See,~' Thomas v. Campbell, 107 Idaho 398, 690 P.2d 333 (1984). Witherspoon 
is a specifically-described beneficiary in two capacities. First, there can be no dispute that 
Witherspoon qualifies as a "representative" of The Point. Liberty knew of Witherspoon's 
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representation of The Point for at least six ( 6) years prior to its execution of the Eighth LMA. Ex. 
F. Second, Witherspoon qualifies as a "successor" or "assign" to Liberty in that Witherspoon 
succeeded to a secured interest in the very property described in the Eighth LMA by virtue of its 
Deed of Trust. Under either term or phrase, Witherspoon qualifies as an expressed third-party 
beneficiary. 19 
E. The District Court Properly Held that the Post Falls Landing Marina 
Improvements Constituted Personal Property. 
The determination as to whether or not an item is personal property or a fixture is generally 
a mixed question oflaw and fact. Rayl v. Shull Enterprises, Inc., 108 Idaho 524, 527, 700 P.2d 567 
(1984). The District Court found: 
that at the time of the installation of the Post Falls Landing Marina and the 
improvements thereto, it was not intended that it [the Marina] would be a permanent 
fixture to the real estate. Because it was not intended that the marina and its 
improvements would be permanent, the third, and most important prong, of the 
fixtures analysis, is not satisfied and the Court finds that the Post Falls Landing 
Marina and the improvements thereto constitute personal property. 
R., Vol. 6, p. 1199. The District Court's determination was correct, both as a matter of fact and law. 
In determining whether a particular article constitutes a fixture, three general tests are to be 
applied: (1) whether the property has been annexed to the realty, either actually or constructively; 
(2) adaptation or application to the use or purpose to which that part of the realty to which it is 
connected is appropriated; and (3) an intention to make the article a permanent accession to the 
freehold. Rayl, 108 Idaho at 527. 
Liberty attacks the District Court's finding on two bases. First, Liberty suggests that the Court 
19The cases cited by Liberty in support of its argument that Witherspoon was not an intended 
or expressed third-party beneficiary (including Resolution Trust v. Kemp. 951 F.2d 657) do not 
address agreements with language similar to that contained in Paragraph 21 of the Eighth LMA. 
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impermissibly focused on only one of the three tests (the intention of the annexing party to make the 
article a permanent accession to the freehold). Second, Liberty argues that the intention of the 
annexing party must be determined objectively rather than subjectively. Specifically, Liberty cites 
Rayl, 108 Idaho at 527, for the proposition that the focus is not to be on the "undisclosed purpose 
of the annexor, but rather the intention implied and manifested by his acts." The District Court's 
ruling, in light of the evidence admitted at trial, without objection, is consistent with the law. 
In making its decision, the District Court considered Mr. Green's testimony as to his 
subjective intentions in the context of Green's description of what had been objectively constructed 
on the property. In other words, the Court's decision, in light of Green's testimony, was based upon 
Green's objective manifestations, as the annexing party, which indicated that the Marina 
improvements were never intended to be converted to real property and were to remain personal 
property. 
In particular, the District Court considered the following: 
(1) The Marina was originally designed to have five (5) ramp connections to the 
upland property, but was revised to have only one connection. Tr., Vol. 1, 
pp. 104-05; Exs. 3, SS. 
(2) The Marina was designed to "pull apart" and "unplug." Green Depo. at pp. 
14-15, 30-32, 42. 
(3) The Marina improvements were largely constructed off site. Tr., Vol. 1, p. 
227. 
(4) The Marina improvements could be removed fairly easily and stored offsite 
for resale to third-parties. Id. at pp. 232-33. 
(5) The Marina was designed in a manner so that it could be moved and located 
anywhere on Lake Coeur d'Alene, subject only to permitting. Green Depo. 
at pp. 30-42, 42. 
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On appeal, Liberty argues that Green's testimony constitutes evidence of an unexpressed 
subjective intention and that the same should be disregarded for purposes of the fixture/personal 
property analysis. The problem with Liberty's argument is three-fold: 
(1) Green's testimony was admitted by stipulation and without objection; 
(2) Green's testimony was independently corroborated by the objective 
manifestations of the use, design, and construction of the Marina 
improvements; and 
3) Additional objective evidence, including evidence offered by Liberty's own 
witnesses, further supported the Court's findings. 
Specifically, the Court's findings were supported by the following non-exhaustive list of additional 
evidence admitted at trial: 
(1) Liberty funded the development of the first phase of condominium 
construction (twenty (20) units), without a commitment or requirement for 
the construction of the Marina. Tr., Vol. 1, p. 117. 
(2) Liberty funded the second phase of condominium development (twenty (20) 
additional units) in a similar manner, i.e., without any commitment or 
requirement that the Marina ever be built and with no obligation to fund the 
same. Id. at p. 117. 
(3) Liberty never bound itself to finance any Marina improvements until after the 
two twenty(20) unit condominium projects had been constructed, and only 
then through a wholly-independent advance. R., Vol. 6, p. 1186, 1 13. 
( 4) The owners of the condominium units had no greater right to use the Marina 
than any general member of the public. Tr., Vol. 1, p. 71. In other words, 
there were no recorded covenants that ran as a benefit to the condominium 
properties, or to any other portion of The Point's property, that gave any 
owner any exclusive right to use or lease the Marina improvements. 
(5) The Submerged Lands Lease with IDL, which authorized the Marina in the 
first place, was for a ten (10) year term, and it required the removal of the 
Marina improvements once the Lease was terminated or otherwise not 
renewed. Exs. QQ, 10. 
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( 6) The Marina generated insignificant revenues during its period of operations. 
R., Vol. 6, pp. 1186-87, ,r 16. 
The foregoing facts, coupled with Green's testimony, substantially supports the District Court's 
conclusion. 
The District Court reasonably concluded, based upon the evidence admitted at trial, as 
follows: (1) the Marina improvements had to be removed if the Lease was terminated, hence they 
couldn't be "permanent;" (2) the Marina improvements weren't an integral component of the 
purpose of the project since they weren't required (or committed to) as a part of any prior 
development on the property; (3) if the Marina was to be an integral component of the property, one 
would reasonably conclude that Liberty would have required that it be constructed in tandem with 
or as a part of the condominium developments; ( 4) the Marina isn't really integral to anything, since 
it was never financially successful, even though its operations were open to both the public and to 
the condominium owners; and (5) the Marina was specifically designed to be easily moved. Simply 
put, there is no support for the proposition that the Court erred in its analysis of the facts in light of 
the operative standards to be applied in the fixture/personal property analysis. 20 
Liberty argues that "the District Court did not consider that the Marina was planned as part 
of Post Falls Landing from the start," was "constructed in conjunction with the two boardwalk 
condominium buildings," and "was planned to be used into the indefinite future." See Appellant's 
20While Idaho has not previously applied the fixture/personal property test to marina 
facilities, other jurisdictions have. In In Re Morgan, 52 T.C. 478 (1969), affirmed 448 F.2d 1397 
(9th Cir. 1971 ), floating docks attached to the land by pilings and gangways were determined not to 
constitute fixtures despite the fact that the docks had electrical and plumbing connections. In Ward 
v. U.S., I 971 W.L. 383 (C.D. Ca. 1971 ), the court held that molded fiberglass docks attached to 
pilings that were sunk into the ground more than seventeen (17) feet were nonetheless personal 
property. 
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Brief at pp. 41-42. Liberty simply attempts to reargue the facts. Liberty's own witnesses testified 
that Liberty had no obligation to fund the Marina as part of the two condominiums projects. Further, 
there was no guarantee that the Marina could be used "into the indefinite future," as the same was 
subject to a ten-year Lease from IDL that required the removal of the improvements in the event the 
Lease was terminated or not renewed. 
Liberty also argues that the Marina's fixed pier dock and boat landing platform included 
components of a different character. While those facilities may not, in and of themselves, be as easily 
removed as the docks, the ultimate removal of the same is still a condition of the IDL Lease. 
Further, there was no evidence admitted at trial that any of the Marina improvements were 
authorized under any easements or recorded agreements. Green Depo. at p. 32. The fact that all 
Marina improvements were designed to be removed, and that they must ultimately be removed, 
supports the District Court's determination that the improvements constitute personal property. 
V. CONCLUSION. 
For the reasons set forth above, Witherspoon respectfully requests that the Court affirm both 
the District Court's Judgment and its denial of Liberty's Motion for Reconsideration. 
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